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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the determinants of household wealth in South Africa, using the National Income 
Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 2. In particular, we look at the effects of the wealth-age profile and other 
household demographic variables. The hump-shaped profile of the wealth and age relationship suggested 
by the life-cycle hypothesis is not present in the data, although there are indications of its presence in the 
upper quantiles of the wealth distribution. The South African wealth distribution does not conform to the 
Lifecycle Hypothesis at this point in time. The LCH model appears to apply only to particular quantiles 
of the population, that is, the wealthier households and the particularly indebted households. In 
particular, the results found these to be households with younger heads, which align with LCH 
predictions. Poorer households, or those whose assets and liabilities are approximately equal do not 
appear to accumulate wealth in the same manner as their upper and lower quantile counterparts. 
However, we cannot formally identify the LCH econometrically at a particular quantile. We found 
evidence of different wealth accumulation behaviour in Tribal Authority Areas, where a dual land tenure 
ownership structure is in place. This has important implications for researchers interested in components 



















































Modern societies tend to exhibit distinct patterns of capital accumulation, with varying levels of 
persistence according to the characteristics of their economies. However, a significant proportion of 
research has been focused on income, rather than wealth, which is remarkable given the importance of 
wealth as a determinant of the consumer’s consumption possibilities. The emphasis on income is partly 
due to the fact that it is easier to measure and more frequently measured in most countries. Furthermore, 
the availability of wealth data is not as widespread as income data owing to its social sensitivity. 
Measurements of wealth require accurate valuations of all assets and liabilities, most of which are not 
easily obtained. For example, the price of assets, such as jewellery or share prices may fluctuate 
considerably during a period of time and in some cases, the value of the asset can only be determined 
upon the sale of said asset (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). Property and assets may also be held in trusts, 
which further exacerbate the issue of measurement. It must be noted that wealth is significantly different 
from income, in that it is possible for an individual/ household to earn large income, but exhibit low net 
worth due to credit - dependent lifestyles (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). 
 
Wealth is especially important during phases of economic insecurity and in terms of intergenerational 
transfers. It allows for consumption smoothing over time, particularly in periods when consumption is 
expected to be high or income is expected to be low. Consumption smoothing is also important when 
households face capital market imperfections or borrowing constraints (Davies & Shorrocks, 1999). The 
behaviour of households has important implications for global growth prospects. More importantly, with 
the growing importance of capital and savings in economies, wealth is crucial to the well being of 
consumers. There are substantial literature on wealth and the macroeconomic modeling of its distribution 
in the developed world (Di Matteo, 2010). However, not much research has been done on this in South 
Africa (SA), especially in the microeconomic context, due to the unavailability of household data on 
components of wealth. 
 
South Africa’s capital accumulation landscape is particularly unique, in that it is one of the most 
inequitable societies in the world, with a large informal sector, alongside an advanced formal sector (Aron 
& Muellbauer, 2006).  During the Apartheid era and post democracy, SA has undergone international 
trade and financial sanctions, foreign disinvestment, capital flight and emigration (Keegan, 1986). 
Financial liberalization in the markets has brought about more competitive markets, rather than bringing 
financial services to poor African households (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). Previously, the white minority 
was afforded education and economic opportunities, while the black population was dispossessed 
(Keegan, 1986). The effects of this discrimination are still present throughout the economy and the lack 
of access to credit and assets for a large proportion of the population severely stunts the households 
sector’s ability to amass wealth (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006).  
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The Apartheid regime systematically and purposefully restricted the majority of South Africans (Africans, 
Coloureds and Asians) from any meaningful participation in the economy (DTI, nd). The assets of those 
discriminated against were both directly and indirectly destroyed. This resulted in a biased accumulation 
process, which confined the creation of wealth to a racial minority (van der Berg, 2011). Furthermore it 
imposed underdevelopment on the disadvantaged populace, ensured the supply of cheap labour and 
undermined self-employment and entrepreneurship opportunities (DTI, nd). This systematic 
disempowerment confined the majority of African people to homeland areas. These areas were the most 
deprived in terms of living standards, infrastructure and business environment (McDonald & Piesse, 
1999). These racially enforced migrations uprooted miliions from their places of residence and lead to 
large capital forfeitures. Consequently, the drastic restriction of property ownership rights of black 
individuals rendered it impossible to acquire assets that could serve as collateral for loan financing (van 
der Berg, 2011). The result is an economic structure, which still excludes the vast majority of South 
Africans from accumulating wealth. 
 
Investigations into the wealth distribution reveal the pattern of wealth accumulating behaviour, as well as 
the type of economy in which people and households operate and the type of society in which they reside 
(Davies & Shorrocks, 1999; Boskin 1991). This paper seeks to investigate South African wealth data 
found in the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 2, as it is the only household survey to hold 
data of this nature in South Africa. In particular, the pattern of wealth accumulation in tribal authority 
areas (TAA) is of interest and whether we can identify significantly different behaviour for households in 
these areas, in comparison to other South African households throughout the wealth distribution. We are 
particularly interested in TAAs, as we believe that there are unidentified specialized wealth patterns 
occurring in these areas. These patterns are as a result of a dual land tenure system that was originally 
associated with the Bantustans of the Apartheid era, but which subsequent to the transition to democracy, 
has remained in place through special legislation guaranteeing traditional tribal chieftainships control over 
all access rights to land in these TAAs. In particular, the land in the area is communally owned and as 
such, the reports of wealth holdings are believed to be inflated. 
 
We find that the data does not appear to conform to the lifecycle hypothesis (LCH) and we identify sign 
similarities in the 5th and 95th quantile. Within the estimation, the tribal authority area coefficient is 
significant and indicates the presence of different wealth accumulation behaviour. The paper is structured 
as follows, the first being a literature review on previous work on wealth. Thereafter follows the 
theoretical approach to the investigation and the methodology. Lastly, we discuss the empirical results 







The focus of wealth research has shifted over the years from overall distribution characteristics to the 
causes of differences in wealth holdings. Pension savings and the growth in availability and sophistication 
of micro datasets have been instrumental to this shift. There is a distinction between models of wealth 
accumulation owing to lifecycle factors and those that concentrate on the intergenerational connections 
between households. Previous work on the subject matter has rarely covered both models simultaneously 
(Davies & Shorrocks, 1999). Wealth, in this context, is defined as the value of all the assets owned by a 
household less the value of the all its liabilities at a particular point in time, also known as net worth. 
 
Davies & Shorrocks (1999) consider five stylised facts regarding wealth, namely: 
 
1) Wealth is distributed more unequally than labour income, total income or consumption expenditure. 
This is true regardless of the inequality indicator used. 
 
2) Financial assets are less equally distributed than non-financial assets, but only when real estate is the 
major component of the non-financial assets. The reverse is true in countries where land value is 
especially important. 
 
3) Similarly, the distribution of inherited wealth is more unequal than wealth in general. 
 
4) Across all age groups, there is generally a set of individuals and households with extremely low net 
worth. Furthermore, the level of financial assets appears to be low in a number of countries, 
including the US. 
 
5) Wealth inequality has trended downwards in the 20th century, but there have been some interruptions 
to this trend and reversals. 
 
There have been various theories formulated to account for the attributes of the wealth distribution; in 
particular, we have the Lifecycle Accumulation theory and Intergenerational Connections (inheritance or 
bequest motives) (Skopek et al, 2014). Inheritance plays an important role throughout the wealth 
distribution; it causes major differences in wealth levels and is an important transmission channel of 
wealth status between generations. However, it plays no role in the intra-generational models. There are 
also noneconomic reasons for accumulating wealth and these are factors such as power or status, which 
may be linked to certain types of assets (Skopek et al, 2014). 
 
For many middle-income households, wealth accumulation follows a pattern over the life cycle; it is low 
among young adults and increases during middle age. It finally reaches a peak just before retirement and 
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then diminishes in the post-retirement years (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). The Lifecycle Hypothesis 
(LCH) model is one of intra-generational accumulation theorised by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). The model posits that households accumulate savings during their 
lifetime as a result of labour market participation and once they retire, they begin to draw from that 
wealth/savings. Furthermore consumers derive utility from the consumption stream over the life cycle 
and the limit to the consumers’ choice is essentially his/her lifetime budget constraint (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954).  
 
The basic assumptions of the model are as follows: 
 Consumers are forward looking 
 Preferences are defined over the present and future consumption 
 A period of retirement is expected at the end of one’s lifetime 
 No uncertainty 
 All consumers face the same constant rate of return r 
 Have same length of life T 
 No bequest motive 
 
The extensions to this model account for household interests in the consumption of offspring and the 
size of planned bequests. Further models include capital market imperfections and borrowing constraints 






where CL is lifetime consumption, EL is lifetime earnings, R is Retirement date and for simplification 
purposes, we ignore leisure. Assuming a non-working period at the end of life, restrictions on the 
functional form of utility will ensure that saving occurs. The household smooths consumption by 
equalising their discounted marginal utility to expenditure in both the present and future periods. In 
general, labour income is expected to rise at a swift pace in the early years and thus much negative net 
worth or substantial net borrowing is expected to be prevalent among younger households (where the 
household head is young) (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954).  The LCH theory is able to deal with 
systematic variations in income occurring over the lifecycle, as a result of the assumption of finitely lived 




Furthermore, the propensity to consume increases with age, while it is lowers for households whose 
preferences generate a higher desired growth of consumption (Modigliani, 1986). The two foremost 
implications of this model are that a humped shaped age-profile of wealth is expected, with the peak at or 
close to retirement age of the household head and that substantial wealth inequality can arise between 
households, even if all other household characteristics remain the same, other than age (Modigliani, 
1986). In other words, age differences alone are expected to have a large impact on the distribution of 
wealth. It must be noted that observed wealth inequality could arise from the fact that households are 
sampled at different points in their lifetimes (Modigliani, 1986). 
 
In contrast to the LCH model, the intergenerational connection model analyses the evolution of the 
wealth distribution over a number of generations and accounts for demographic factors, such as patterns 
of fertility, marriage, and other economic factors (estate division, taxation etc.). The simplest case is one 
of a society in which all individuals marry, produce offspring and bestow bequests upon their offspring 
equal to the amount, which they themselves inherited in the previous period. Thus, the current 
distribution of wealth depends on the wealth distribution of the previous generation, as well as the 
patterns of marriage, fertility, estate division and taxation (Davies & Shorrocks, 1999). 
 
There are also models of intergenerational transfer, which are based on a particular specification of 
parental preferences, in particular altruism. The model utilises the Beckerian approach, which assumes 
that parental preferences are dependent on the lifetime consumption of parents and the lifetime 
consumption of each child. Under altruism, parents plan to completely equalise their children’s incomes 
(net of transfers) (Davies & Shorrocks, 1999). 
 
More recently, wealth is enjoying a renewal in research interest, especially with the release of Thomas 
Picketty’s book ‘Capital in the 21st Century’. In Picketty’s work on capital, he argues that the rate of return 
on capital tends to be higher than the economy’s rate of growth. This is a contradiction of capitalism and 
previous literature on wealth. This indicates that wealth accumulated in the past grows faster than output 
and wages (Milanovic, 2014). Since capital ownership tends to be concentrated globally, we have growing 
income and wealth inequality (Milanovic, 2014). This is the pernicious effect of capital on the distribution 
of income and wealth. In particular, this effect stems from inherited wealth. As fortunes grow with each 
generation, the gap between the wealthy and the poor continues to grow. The inequality in labour income 
also adds to this bequest effect and is at odds with the capital accumulation argument (Milanovic, 2014). 
 
In order to combat the widening inequality, Picketty argues for a wealth tax in each country, as well as a 
global wealth tax. This is meant to bolster income inequality, as he argues that wealth is the source of 
income inequality. The global tax is required in order to eliminate the possibility of the wealthy moving 
their assets to countries with more lenient wealth tax schemes (Aspromourgos, 2014). The implications of 
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this analysis for South Africa are far-reaching. Contrary to Picketty’s work, SA’s income inequality had 
little variation, notwithstanding the social transfers and policies enacted to turn the tide. The wealth tax 
would have little effect on SA’s inequality levels, as research has shown that of the 14 million registered 
tax payers, only 8.4% earn more then R500 000 per annum and contribute 54.4% of all tax revenue 
(National Treasury, 2014). 
 
The theories regarding wealth distribution have largely been as a result of the empirical work at the time. 
Prior to the 60s, data on wealth was obtained predominantly from estate tax and wealth tax records, with 
other evidence coming from small unrepresentative surveys and other sources (Davies & Shorrocks, 
1999). However, in South Africa, the lack of wealth data has remained an issue well into the 20th century. 
Previously, most empirical work has been based on data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 
who collect macroeconomic data on income, expenditure, savings and debt (Daniels et al, 2014). 
 
The South African legacy is one filled with conquest, settlement, colonisation and, more recently, 
segregation under Apartheid rule. The Natives Land Act, Act no. 27 of 1913 prevented Africans from 
freely buying land in certain provinces in South Africa. Colonialism, along with Apartheid, allowed for the 
development of pluralistic forms of property rights and, in turn, has resulted in challenges for land tenure 
reform (Home, 2013). The problem was not only the unequal land distributions, but also the insecurity of 
land tenure, that is, the inability to impose land rights against the claims of others and the inability to 
profit from the capital and labour invested in the land (Ramutsindela, 2012). The customary land tenure 
did not confer ownership or the creation of private property rights upon the ‘natives’ who occupied the 
land and as such created two parallel land tenure systems. These dual systems were reinforced by the 
implementation of separate administrative arrangements and separate land development policies (Home, 
2013). 
 
The nationalist government instituted racially based land reforms and consolidated the native reserves 
into ten self-governing homelands. Each homeland had its own assemblies, government departments and 
rights to confer citizenship (Hoeks et al, 2014). Prior to 1948, thousands of Africans owned land in South 
Africa. Forced removals during apartheid, however, lead to severe land losses in favour of Whites 
(Feinberg, 1995). The government instituted policies, which systematically discriminated on the basis of 
race. These policies in turn restricted the income generating opportunities open to non-whites and 
created a legacy of inequality that has been passed down through generations (Nattrass & Seekings, 2001). 
After the abolishment of Apartheid, the constitution required the government to undertake legislative 





Since that time, Apartheid laws governing land ownership have been repealed. However, land in the 
former Bantustans is still subject to the chiefs and tribal authorities and continues to be registered in the 
name of the State (Adams et al, 1999). As such, there had been longstanding disputes between 
government and local leaders with regards to the ownership and control of the land. The traditional 
leaders argue that the state initiatives undermine the pre-existing land rights, whilst the local government 
argues that the tribal authorities hinder development (Cousins, 2007). In traditional authority areas, all 
members of the tribe jointly own the land. The leader of the tribe can allocate access to the land for both 
tribe members and non-tribe members, although tribe members enjoy preference with regards to non-
tribe members (Adams et al, 1999). 
 
The 1994 Land Rights Act (amended in 2008), along with the 1996 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 
and the 1997 Extension of Security Tenure Act were aimed at restoring the property rights of persons 
and communities dispossessed of property owing to past racial discriminatory laws. These Acts allowed 
for the establishment of the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and a Lands Claims Court, in 
order to process restitution claims, as well as the protection of rural groups with insecure tenure 
arrangements (Hoeks et al, 2014). The 1997 Settlement Land Acquisition Grant created a grant that 
allowed for the purchase of land, tenure rights enhancement, investment in infrastructure, home 
improvement and farm capital. The 1997 White paper on the topic was aimed at creating a land reform 
strategy, with three main considerations, namely, land restitution, land redistribution and tenure reform 
(Hoeks et al, 2014).  
 
Following the recommendations laid out in the aforementioned White paper, the 2001 Land 
Redistribution and Agricultural Development Programme instituted a sliding scale basis grant, which 
matched applicants’ own contributions and concentrated on the transfer of agricultural land to distinct 
individuals and the improvement of access to municipal and tribal land for grazing purposes. 
Furthermore, the 2004 communal Land Rights Act attempted to combine customary land tenure 
practices and titling, by entrusting ownership of the land in Tribal Authority Areas to Traditional 
Councils. However, this Act was declared unconstitutional in 2010, as it seemed to yield more power to 
the Tribal Authorities, rather than individuals in the community (Ramutsindela, 2012; Hoeks et al, 2014). 
Finally, the 2008 Provision of Land Assistance Amendment Act sought to control the provision of 
financial assistance for the acquisition or improvement of land and tenure rights (Hoeks et al, 2014). 
 
Land reform progress has been limited, as most of the government’s efforts had been directed at land 
restitution and redistribution. This inadequate progress has been attributed to the complexity of the 
issues, the dispute between Traditional councils and government on both administrative and physical 
jurisdiction, as well as the problem of ‘elite’ individuals, who are able to manipulate the tilting process to 
their advantage (Hoeks et al, 2014). In Fay’s (2009) work on land tenure in SA, he argues the importance 
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of recognising community driven processes of land reform, rather than state interventions, as the tribal 
communities appear to have resisted and largely ignored these efforts (Fay, 2009). 
Aron & Muellbauer (2006), estimated household sector wealth for South Africa, utilising published data 
on financial flows and other capital market data (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). They created the main 
elements of the household sector balance sheet in order to understand the evolution of aggregate 
consumer spending and saving (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). Their work revealed that pension wealth had 
increased significantly over the years, especially in comparison to housing wealth and increasing debt. 
They associated part of the increase to financial liberalization in the economy and the influence of 
changing tax policies (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). Directly held securities were shown to have a 
downward trend and cyclical behaviour driven by fluxes in real share prices. Lastly, the household debt 
ratio had risen between the early 1980s and the late 1990s (Aron & Muellbauer, 2006). Furthermore, the 
paper argued that the estimates were limited by the lack of data in two important areas, namely household 
sector ownership of foreign assets and the assets of unincorporated businesses (Aron & Muellbauer, 
2006). 
 
In 2013 in ‘Wealth, Credit Conditions and Consumption: Evidence from South Africa’, the same authors 
constructed a data intensive exploration of wealth and collateral effects (Aron & Muellbauer, 2013). They 
argued that SA’s expenditure was largely generated by households employed in the formal sector, which is 
striking considering the large size of the informal sector in the economy (Aron & Muellbauer, 2013). 
Utilising their constructed measures of marginal propensities to consume they found credit liberalisaton 
to be the important factor. The main findings of the paper were that a conventional lifecycle view of 
consumption for SA was not applicable due to the structure of the credit market. Furthermore, credit 
market liberalization increases the average propensity to consume and interaction effects are present 
between credit market liberalization, expected income growth and housing wealth (Aron & Muellbauer, 
2013). Finally, the findings indicated that housing wealth effects significantly surpasses stock market 
wealth effects in South Africa (Aron & Muellbauer, 2013). 
 
Zimmer & Das (2014) studied how household wealth varies across household composition in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Zimmer & Das, 2014). The authors hypothesized that household composition plays an 
essential role in household wealth. However, the unique characteristics of Sub-Saharan African countries 
have rendered traditional systems of within household wealth distribution less dependable. These 
characteristics are issues such as increasing poverty, labour-based migration and the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(Zimmer & Das, 2014). Contrasting all household compositions with those containing an older person, 
the results indicated that households with older persons present have less wealth than other household 
types (Zimmer & Das, 2014). Furthermore, larger households, households with younger heads, those 
with male heads and those living in urban areas tend to accumulate less wealth in comparison to other 
household types (Zimmer & Das, 2014). 
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In Ngwenya & Paas (2012) the authors attempt to assess ownership of 16 financial products by 
households in different lifecycle stages amongst four ethnic groups (Africans, Coloureds, Asians, and 
Whites) in South Africa (Ngwenya & Paas, 2012). The paper discusses the applicability of the LCH to 
South Africa and found that the relevance of the LCH was unclear, particularly within racial groups. They 
hypothesized that the LCH predictions would not hold for previously disadvantaged South Africans and 
results indicated that younger households did not incur more debts and that intermediate cycle 
households did not own more assets (Ngwenya & Paas, 2012). However, the LCH predictions do appear 
to be consistent for White households across the age cohorts. Furthermore, among the African, Coloured 
and Asian ethnic groups, the results showed that younger, relatively wealth and educated households 
tended to own more financial products (Ngwenya & Paas, 2012). 
 
The expectation is that the lifecycle hypothesis will not hold within quantiles and should not do so for 
any particular reason. Quantile regression seeks to identify effects at particular points, quantiles, as 
defined by the researcher. Each quantile represents a different proportion of the sample population and 
these do not necessarily correspond in any way to particular ages or age cohorts. We cannot test the LCH 
predictions at a particular quantile point, only across the entire distribution. Thus, a LCH prediction 
‘violation’ within a quantile does not nullify the use of the LCH theory in our estimation.  
 
For our purposes, the 5th quantile represents those households with negative net worth. We argue that 
they may be high-income households whom are extremely indebted in relation to their assets. The 50th 
quantile represents those with approximately zero net worth, that is, the poor and the 95th quantile 
represent those households with high net worth values. We anticipate that violations of the theory 
presented will occur in the 50th quantile, where households are unable to accumulate wealth in the same 




The National Income Dynamics Study is the only nationally representative household survey to include 
questions on household wealth; it follows households over time and can be used in both the cross 
sectional context (single wave) and panel context (merged waves). Wealth questions, however, were only 
examined in Wave 2, and more recently Wave 4, which has yet to be released to the public. Thus, the data 
is utilised in its cross sectional context. 
The survey examines a large number of detailed questions about different assets and liabilities, which 
allowed for the construction of each component of the total net worth of the household and individuals. 
Observations on inheritance are available in the dataset, but they are too few to feasibly utilise. For a 
detailed description of the wealth construct in NIDS Wave 2, see (Daniels et al, 2014). The survey itself 
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asks detailed information on all members of the household, encompassing residents and non-residents at 
the time. Data was collected from three main categories, namely, households, adults and children, on the 
topics of household characteristics, mortality history, living standards, expenditure, consumption, 
demographics, education, labour force participation, income, health, wealth, education and family support 
(NIDS, 2012). 
Utilising Wave 2 of the NIDS dataset, specifically looking at the household wealth variables and its 
components, we consider assets, liabilities and household demographic variables. We use weighted 
quantile regressions to examine the distribution of wealth, which corrects for the potential bias arising 
from non-random sample attrition (Maitra & Vahid, 2005). The financial variables were deflated using the 
CPI value for the base month, September 2010. All incomplete observations were set to missing and 
duplicate household observations were removed. We excluded the extreme observations of the derived 
net worth variable only, using the bacon algorithm of outlier detection method in STATA. For a detailed 
discussion of the bacon algorithm, see Appendix One. Outliers are a major concern when dealing with 
wealth data, as they skew the distribution far more than outliers in income data. The sheer distance of the 
outliers from the mean in our dataset and the high weights associated with each outlier household, assert 
a level of influence that skews our analysis to a great extent (Daniels et al, 2014). All plots, graphs and 
estimations are weighted to account for attrition as a result of nonresponse from households between 
waves. 
 
The net worth variable has been transformed, utilising the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which 
is defined as: 
log(yi+(yi2+1)1/2) 
where yi is the variable of interest. Except for very small values of y, the inverse sine is approximately 
equal to log(2yi) or log(2)+log(yi). Thus it is interpreted in the same manner as a standard logarithmic 
dependent variable. However, the inverse hyperbolic sine is defined at zero, it is an alternative 
transformation for correcting the problems of excluding zero and negative wealth values, 
disproportionately misrepresenting wealth for some households (Friedline et al, 2012).  Looking at the 
kernel density plots of the IHS transformed net worth variable. The distribution graph Figure 1 shows 











ii. Estimation Methods 
 
Research into the socioeconomic determinants of households requires knowledge of the socioeconomic 
position of said households. Researchers, especially in cases where wealth data is unavailable or unreliable, 
rely on income or expenditure as a measure of household standard of living (Hargreaves et al, 2007). 
Furthermore, there are a number of important psychological variables, such as preference parameters like 
the degree of risk version, self-control, taste for saving and voting patterns (Skopek et al, 2014). Thus, we 
have the problem of omitted variable bias, as we do not have these variables. Consequently, we are 
looking at the static implications of a dynamic model, at a single time point. 
Models of households with heterogeneous preferences amongst its members have become the standard 
framework for analysing household behavior (Matilla-Wiro, 1999). Most economic and financial decisions 
are made at the household level and it is often assumed that households behave as if they were single 
decision-making unit maximizing a well-behaved utility function (Matilla-Wiro, 1999). Examining 
household behavior and individual behaviour are not identical investigations, however, in most surveys 
respondents are usually the representative head of the household (Matilla-Wiro, 1999). Thus, most 
household investigations require the adaptation of individual level variables into those of the 
representative household head and then into household variables. 
Wealth accumulation models have tended to be macroeconomic general equilibrium, quantitative models, 
with heterogenous agents. Generally, there are three main types of models used, namely, overlapping 
generations (OLG) models, infinitely lived models and a model that involves a mixture of both. This 
investigation is different, in that it is micro-founded, although it does entail utilising the LCH in a similar 
manner to the OLG model (Cagetti & De Nardi, 2008). There is a common theme found in the 
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explanatory variables utilised in the micro-founded models. The literature found the key determinant 
variables to be gender, educational attainment, household composition, occupation, ethnic origin, 
birthplace, urbanisation, and age (Meng, 2007; Di Matteo, 2010; van Rooij et al, 2012; Skopek et al, 2014; 
Heady et al, 2008). 
Turning to estimation, the wealth equation is based on Heady et al (2008) (Heady et al, 2008). Heady et al 
(2008) was chosen as the Australian economy has had similar discrimination issues and colonization as 
South Africa (Heady et al, 2008). Furthermore, the wealth distribution has similar characteristics to the 
South African wealth distribution; namely assets are heavily concentrated in older households, pension 
wealth is increasing rapidly and the main assets are real estate and financial. (Heady et al, 2008; Aron & 
Muellbauer 2006). The authors utilized characteristics that household occupants were born with, 
education, household type, health, hours worked, income, and attitudinal variables as determinants of 
wealth (Heady et al, 2008). We estimate, 
 
W = β0 + β1gender + β2 education + β3 race +β4 marital status +β5 geotype +β6health +β7 work hours 
+β8 age+ β9 age2  + β10 children 
 
 
Where W is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of net worth, β0  is the expected median net worth 
level of a single white female, who has fair health, no children and lives in an rural formal area. Race, 
geotype, marital status and health are dummy variables split into various categories shown in the 
regression tables. The covariates are individual respondent variables, thus we restrict them to be the 
observations of the household head and subsequently created household variables from those 
observations. Variables such as income and work hours are not included. Income is omitted as it is too 
closely related to wealth and will skew any estimates. Furthermore, work hours are not included as it 
limits the sample to only the employed households. For a clearer understanding of all variables utilised, 
Table One below details the variables, the rationale for inclusion in the model and the expected effect on 




Table One: Explanatory Variables 
Variable Details Rationale for Inclusion Expected Effect 
Gender Dummy variable for whether 
the respondent is male or not 
Personal characteristics of respondents Positive; In the case of gender, one would 
expect men to accumulate more wealth than women. 
Race Dummy variables for 4 race 
categories 
Categories: African, Coloured, 
Asian 
Base Category: White 





This is due to the legacy of discrimination 




Living wit Partner 
Base Category: Never Married 
Personal characteristics of respondents Positive; Marital status for men would be expected to have a positive 
effect on the level of terminal wealth. Married women provided unpaid labour, such 
as child care, which allows men to work. 
Geotype Dummies for 4 categories of 
geographic location 
Categories: Urban Formal, 
Tribal Authority Area, Urban 
Informal 
Base Category: Rural Formal 
Testing the effect of location, particularly with reference to TAAs which may 
have unidentified effects. 
Positive; Urban areas were concentrations of industry and commerce, where one 
would expect, on average, to see higher levels of 
wealth. 
 
Negtive; Tribal Authority Areas tend to have agricultural based economies and are 
less integrated with the economy. 
Health Dummies for 5 categories of 
well-being; Respondent’s 
perceived health status 
Categories: Excellent Health, 
Very Good Health, Good 
Health, Poor Health 
Base Category: Fair 
Personal characteristics of respondents Positive; For those who are well, they are expected to spend less money on health 
care 
Negative; For those weho are ill, they are expected to spend more money on health 
care 
Education Education in years Testing the effect of education Positive; One would expect to see wealth increase as the respondent’s years of 
education increases. 
Age Age in years The test of the life-cycle motive for saving is the inclusion of age and age 
squared as variables to see whether a hump-shaped wealth-age profile with 
statistically significant coefficients emerges. 
Positive; Net worth increases with age but because we are using cross-sectional data, 
we cannot 




Tables Three and Four in the analytical section indicate the results of the OLS estimation and the quantile 
estimation of the wealth equation. The regression diagnostics in Appendix Two and Appendix Three 
reveal that the use of OLS leads to a misspecified model. Thus, quantile regression is apt for the model, 
as the covariates affect our dependent variable differently across its distribution and we want to 
investigation different points within our sample. Quantile regression extends the idea of quantiles to the 
estimation of conditional quantile functions (Koenker & Portnoy, 1999). It models quantiles of the 
conditional distribution of the response variable as functions of observed covariates (Koenker & Portnoy, 
1999). 
 
The quantile is defined through an optimisation problem, where the median is defined as the solution to 
the problem of minimising a sum of absolute residuals. The symmetry of the absolute value function 
implies that the minimisation of the sum of absolute residuals must equate the number of positive and 
negative residuals (Koenker & Portnoy, 1999). This ensures that there is the same number of residuals, 
both above and below the median. In order to specify the other quantiles, we minimise a sum of 
asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals, by giving differing weights to the negative and positive 
residuals (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). Solving 
 
Min ξεR   Σ ρτ (Yi- ξ) 
 
Where ρτ is the tilted absolute value function that yields the τth sample quantile as its solution. In order to 
specify the conditional quantiles, we solve the minimisation problem for the estimate of the conditional 
median function (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). We replace the scalar ξ with the parameter ξ (χ ,β) and set  
ρτ=0.5. To obtain the estimates of the other conditional quantile functions, we replace the absolute values 
by ρτ(.) and solve 
Min β εR
ρ   Σ ρτ (Yi- ξ (χ ,β)) 
 
utilising linear programming methods (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). The quantile regression estimator is 
found to be asymptotically normally distributed, more robust to outliers and non-normal errors than 
OLS. The estimation process allows for a more detailed characterisation of the data, in order to consider 
the impact of a particular explanatory variable on the entire distribution of the response variable, and not 
simply its impact on the conditional mean. Furthermore it is invariant to monotonic transformations of 
the estimation equation and is semi-parametric, as it avoids any assumptions about the parametric 
distribution of the error process (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). 
 
The conditional quantile functions of the response variable y, given covariates, x, are assumed to all be 
parallel to each other, according to the classical theory of linear regression. This implies that the slope 
coefficients of individual quantile regressions will be identical, however, in practice they tend to vary 
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across quantiles. The Wald test involves testing for equality of slope parameters across quantiles, in order 
to allow for correct inference with regards to the estimation (Koenker & Portnoy, 1999). 
 
The final estimated wealth equation  
 
W = β0 + β1 gender + β2 number of children + β3 race +β4 marital status +β5 geotype +β6 health +β7 
work hours +β8 age+ β9 age2 +β10 age3 +β11 age4 
 
The final model is exactly the one estimated in the previous regressions, except that we have improved 
the model by changing to an age quartic to an age quadratic format. The age quadratic was originally 
chosen to test the life cycle hypothesis and as seen in Figure 6, this format is not representative of the 
data’s distribution. An investigation into a specification involving age cohorts revealed the depth of non-
linearity in derived ne worth and the quartic structure was imposed as it best fit the distribution. The 
investigation into the appropriate age specification is detailed in the descriptive section below. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
i. Descriptive 
Table Two below presents the summary statistics of the components of net worth, as well as variables 
from the econometric model, barring the binary variables. The one shot variable is in answer to the 
survey question: ‘Suppose you (and your household members living here) were to sell off all your major 
possessions (including your home), turn all of your investments into cash and pay all your debts –would 
you have something left over, breakeven or be in debt?’ (Daniels et al, 2014). The results indicate that the 
two measures of household wealth are vastly different, with the derived net worth showing much larger 
variance than the one shot measure (Daniels et al, 2014). Furthermore, the 10th, 25th and 50th percentile 
have zero as their net worth observations, signifying that households in these percentiles do not perceive 
themselves to have a positive or negative net worth. 
 
As mentioned in Daniels et al (2014), the minimum values for several of the assets and liabilities variables 
are shown to be approximately 1 (Daniels et al, 2014). This indicates the presence of outliers, particularly 
at the bottom end of the distribution (Daniels et al, 2014). This finding further reiterates the need for the 
use of the bacon algorithm of outlier detection on the net worth variable. The oldest household head is 
shown to be 104 years old, indicating the possible presence of intergenerational effects present in the 
distribution, although not explicitly modeled. There are significantly more assets reported than liabilities. 
The financial and real estate assets are the largest contributors to total assets, whereas financial liabilities 
are the largest component of total debts. The Coefficient of Variation values are relatively small, except 
for total assets, real estate assets, vehicle assets and financial assets. This indicates that these variables 




Table Two: Summary Statistics (2010 Rand, weighted) 
Variable Min P10 P25 P50 Mean P75 P95 Max Coefficient of Variation N 
Derived Net Worth -1000000 -673.170 147.166 7203.905 118026.4 67763.41 840557.6 1692280 2.391 2909 
One-shot Net Worth -1000000 0 0 0 188551.3 20022.57 1001129 2.50e+07 4.396 1865 
Total Assets .950 148.493 1047.638 18993.58 509160.5 116582.7 1846680 3.11e+08 8.523 2571 
Real Estate .950 1007.955 5005.644 40318.18 487184.9 300338.6 1200000 3.11e+08 10.235 1740 
Business 100.796 1966.741 5039.773 74831.27 296773.8 200225.7 2015909 2950111 1.919 59 
Vehicles 30.034 15016.93 29145.67 55983.27 199927.7 114128.7 388062.5 6.81e+07 10.107 373 
Financial .998 49.49777 110.666 482.0485 161751.1 3074.261 504518 1.50e+07 5.522 1604 
Retirement Annuity 149.663 503.977 1088.591 14966.25 487143.7 500564.3 1209546 6228513 2.726 73 
Livestock 39.335 1097.525 2950.111 11879.46 39004.94 44538.08 163639.6 512895.8 1.570 95 
Total Debts 1.008 484.170 1609.912 7055.682 73540.48 28872.5 496796.1 1181853 2.268 812 
Real Estate 35.040 400 50056.43 181431.8 246186.7 400451.5 712259.1 1100000 .953 125 
Business 1.008 1001.129 3003.386 5039.773 9976.715 16268.34 35000 104464.7 1.201 13 
Vehicles 160.181 9000 10079.55 29230.68 68848.09 90101.58 302386.4 399299.7 1.278 61 
Financial 4.983 399.100 1209.546 3573.76 9786.152 10000 33041.24 409762 2.118 735 
Age 15 26 32 40 43.003 53 71 104 .340 3516 
Years of Education 1 5 8 10 9.775 12 15 18 .332 2910 
Children 1 1 1 2 1.994 3 4 7 .589 1275 
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Turning to the composition of wealth across age profiles and geographical areas, calculated as per Daniels 
et al, (2014) (Daniels et al, 2014). Figures 2 through 4 show the assets and liabilities across specific age 
cohorts of the household head and across the four geographical sub-divisions, namely: Rural Formal 
(RF), Urban Formal (UF), Urban Informal (UI) and Tribal Authority Area (TAA). Figure 2 below 
characterizes the liabilities across age cohorts; it shows that real estate debt dominates from ages 25 to 74. 
It increases from age cohorts 15 to 24 to 25 to 34, remains constant from ages 25 to 44 and then starts 
declining from ages 45 to 74. It appears to be nonexistent in the cohort of household heads aged 75 and 
over. Financial debts are most prevalent in the very oldest cohort (75 & over) and the very youngest 
cohort (15 to 24). Vehicle debt tends to be a minor component from ages 25 to 74, whereas business 
debts are infinitesimal from ages 25 to 75. 
 
Figure 2: Portfolio of Liabilities by Age Cohort 
 
 
Figure 3 below indicates assets over the age cohorts and similarly to Figure 2, real estate assets dominate 
throughout the age cohorts. This is an expected result for the older age cohorts, as they accumulate real 
estate debt when they are younger and as they earn more income over the years, they are able to pay off 
this debt and turn it into an asset. However, the prevalence of real estate assets in the youngest age cohort 
(15 to 24) is puzzling, as there is no corresponding real estate debt in the same age cohort in Figure 2. 
This indicates the presence of an unknown real estate effect in the younger cohort. Livestock, retirement 
and business assets are minor components throughout the age cohorts, whereas financial assets increase 
from the youngest age cohort to age cohort 45 to 54 and then begin decreasing from ages 55 to the oldest 
cohort. This is as expected as we hypothesise that households accumulate financial assets as they get older 





Figure 3: Portfolio of Assets by Age Cohort 
 
 
Turning to the composition of liabilities across geographic locations, Figure 4 indicates that Rural Formal 
areas consist almost entirely of real estate and financial debt, with minor slivers of vehicle and business 
debt present as well. The real estate assets owned in the TAA would chiefly be the land upon which 
homes are built and the dwelling itself. The TAA displays a relatively minor component of real estate 
debt, with extensive vehicle and financial debt. Both Urban Formal and Urban Informal exhibit a large 
real estate debt component, with UF showing minor components of vehicle and financial debt and the 
remaining space in UI dominated by financial debts. The composition of liabilities is as expected for each 
geographical area, since property was given to communities in the tribal authority areas, it is expected that 
financial debt would be the most prominent liability. Similarly for rural formal and urban formal, real 
estate debt is expected to be the largest component, as the largest liability would be the acquisition of 
land. 
Figure 4: Portfolio of Liabilities by Geotype 
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Finally, in Figure 5, we look at the asset composition over the geographic areas. Similar to the age profile 
of assets, the geographical composition of assets consists mainly of real estate assets. Rural Formal (RF) 
and Tribal Authority Areas appear to have little variation in asset composition, with RF showing minor 
livestock, vehicle, business and financial assets. Urban informal has the largest variation, although real 
estate debt is still the overriding factor. As noted in both Figure 2 and 3, there appears to be some 
unknown effect occurring within younger age cohorts regarding real estate. Similarly, we have extensive 
real estate assets present in the TAAs, however; the corresponding TAA real estate debt component in 
Figure 4 is relatively minor. The property asset allocation prominence in TAAs is precisely the 
conundrum at hand. The land in the area is communally owned, so we cannot separate 
household/individuals/ communal land ownership and ascertain the true level of wealth in these areas. 
We hypothesise that the real estate assets values for TAAs are inflated, as these households report that 
they are the owners of their land/holdings, when this is in fact not the case. 
 
Figure 5: Portfolio of Assets by Geotype 
 
Following from the descriptive analysis, we expect to see a similarity between the end points of the 
distribution, namely the 5th and 95th quantiles. This is as a result of similar behaviour in these quantiles. As 
previously mentioned, those households in the lower quantiles are not necessarily living in poverty, but 
rather utilise a large amount of credit. If these tail similarities were present, it would be evidence of similar 
behaviour of households in these quantiles. However, it would not be enough to conclusively state the 
presence of high-income households in the 5th quantile. 
 
Turning now to the estimation of the original economic model with the quadratic age variables, to allow 
for the testing of the Lifecycle hypothesis. In Table Three below, the results of the OLS estimation of the 
original econometric model are contrasted with results of the quantile regression estimation. At first 
glance, we see that the gender coefficient is insignificant in both forms of estimation and across every 
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quantile tested. The coefficients of the gender variable are negative in the OLS estimation and in the 5th, 
10th, 50th and 95th quantile estimation. Furthermore, there is no discernible pattern in its magnitude across 
the quantiles. Thus, aligned with the literature by Zimmer & Das (2014), the results indicate that more 
often than not, male- headed households are less wealthy than female-headed households (Zimmer & 
Das, 2014). Similarly, the dummy variables for the various health categories are also all insignificant in 
both OLS and quantile regression, except for the Poor Health dummy variable, which is significant at the 
5% significance level in the 95th quantile. The Poor Health coefficients decrease in size, although not by 
much, as we move from the 10th quantile to the 95th quantile. The coefficient on education is only 
significant in the 25th quantile at the 10% significance level and at the 50th, 75th and 95th quantile at the 1% 
significance level. The OLS education coefficient is significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
The race coefficients appear to be significant in almost every quantile and the OLS estimation at various 
significance levels. Their coefficients also appear to increase in magnitude from the 5th to the 95th 
quantile. The African and Coloured coefficients are all negative, whereas the Asian coefficients are only 
positive in the 25th, 50th and 95th quantiles. The geotype variables also have significant coefficients across 
every quantile and the OLS estimation, although less so in the 5th and 10th quantile. The TAA coefficient 
seems to be most significant around the 50th quantile, which is expected as this quantile represents the 
poor with approximately zero net worth. It must be noted that all coefficients of the geotype variables in 
every quantile are positive in comparison to rural formal households. This result seems plausible for UF 
and possibly even UI households in comparison to RF households. However, this is not an expected 
result between TAA and RF. Again, there seems to be some hidden effect driving wealth accumulation 
inside Tribal Authority Areas. This hidden effect is believed to be a direct result of the dual land tenure 
system in South Africa.   
 
The coefficients on the variables relating to marital status have more varied effects. The significance of 
the positive married coefficients is at the 1% significance level in the 50th, 75th and 95th quantile and at the 
10% significance level in the 5th quantile, with a negative coefficient. This seems to indicate that being 
married only aids in wealth accumulation for the wealthier proportion of the sample. Living with Partner 
appears to have negative coefficients throughout the quantiles, except for the 10th quantile and none of 
these coefficients are significant at any level. The quadratic specification of the age variable is significant 
only at the 5th quantile at the 10% significance level, the 50th quantile at the 5% significance level and at 
the 75th quantile at the 1% significance level. Similarly, the quadratic age specification remains 
insignificant, except for the 5th and 75th quantile. This does not indicate a violation of the lifecycle 
hypothesis, as the theory is not expected to hold within each quantile. Overall, the OLS model was 
declared insufficient to model the wealth distribution, as the model failed the diagnostic testing of OLS 
assumptions shown in Appendix Two. The quantile model is inadequate with regards to the specification 
of the age variables.  
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Table Three: OLS and Quantile Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: IHS Net Worth 
 OLS Quantile 
  0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
Gender -0.239 -0.939 -2.157 0.130 -0.0375 0.194 -0.00623 
 (0.442) (0.931) (1.450) (0.906) (0.298) (0.174) (0.198) 
Age 0.127* 0.0467 0.0384 0.199 0.137** 0.0910*** 0.0643 
 (0.0672) (0.156) (0.201) (0.138) (0.0593) (0.0284) (0.0393) 
Age2 -0.00109* -0.000812 -0.000277 -0.00164 -0.00112* -0.000722** -0.000484 
 (0.000634) (0.00163) (0.00184) (0.00131) (0.000598) (0.000297) (0.000346) 
Education 0.122** -0.142 0.00637 0.194* 0.197*** 0.129*** 0.0920*** 
 (0.0522) (0.157) (0.189) (0.0989) (0.0362) (0.0207) (0.0283) 
African -5.284*** -20.47* -20.01*** -5.856*** -2.947*** -1.644*** -1.474*** 
 (1.317) (11.15) (6.410) (1.453) (0.514) (0.424) (0.540) 
Coloured -3.965*** -20.59* -18.42*** -3.438** -1.936*** -1.240*** -1.209** 
 (1.353) (11.24) (7.005) (1.494) (0.420) (0.445) (0.549) 
Asian -3.343 -24.33* -24.62** 1.016 0.0791 -0.489 0.0835 
 (2.201) (14.01) (12.29) (8.068) (0.910) (0.623) (0.835) 
Children -0.167 -0.183 -0.112 -0.162 -0.0975 -0.0665 -0.0663 
 (0.168) (0.387) (0.709) (0.233) (0.111) (0.0719) (0.0880) 
Married 0.885* -1.541* -0.281 1.170 1.211*** 0.839*** 0.795*** 
 (0.481) (0.896) (1.242) (1.013) (0.403) (0.182) (0.251) 
Living with Partner -0.251 -0.696 1.399 -0.434 -0.175 -0.118 -0.103 
 (0.667) (1.211) (1.871) (1.855) (0.464) (0.229) (0.489) 
Widowed 1.129** 0.577 0.571 1.336 0.891* 0.568** 0.292 
 (0.568) (1.567) (1.600) (1.008) (0.470) (0.240) (0.386) 
Divorced/Separated -1.150 -1.036 -1.256 -4.328** -0.775 0.552 0.457 
 (0.925) (1.302) (1.956) (1.947) (1.042) (0.517) (0.409) 
Urban Informal 2.844*** 1.574 1.790 7.109*** 3.411*** 0.534 0.608 
 (0.853) (1.294) (2.493) (2.201) (1.082) (0.452) (0.452) 
Tribal Authority Area 3.722*** 2.730* 8.213*** 6.520*** 3.674*** 0.802** 0.766** 
 (0.659) (1.565) (1.523) (1.517) (1.010) (0.376) (0.316) 
Urban Formal 2.689*** 1.059 1.581 5.453*** 3.407*** 1.125*** 1.353*** 
 (0.636) (0.855) (1.307) (1.556) (1.040) (0.394) (0.358) 
Excellent Health 0.878 0.147 1.199 1.104 0.619 0.361 -0.170 
 (0.587) (1.217) (1.439) (1.834) (0.510) (0.251) (0.339) 
Very Good Health 0.745 -0.0940 0.896 1.106 0.611 0.114 -0.480 
 (0.581) (1.190) (1.634) (1.811) (0.447) (0.274) (0.323) 
Good Health 0.210 -0.0450 0.223 0.332 -0.00310 -0.182 -0.340 
 (0.580) (1.203) (1.322) (1.910) (0.443) (0.282) (0.332) 
Poor Health 0.242 -0.0146 3.258 0.438 -0.595 -0.264 -0.903** 
 (0.825) (3.504) (2.397) (2.044) (0.690) (0.405) (0.428) 
Constant 4.433* 12.47 10.01 -2.455 3.169* 8.316*** 11.01*** 
 (2.394) (12.11) (8.986) (5.020) (1.629) (0.885) (1.184) 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.0384 0.0889 0.0505 0.0554 0.0590 0.1011 
Observations 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dummy variable base categories are as follows, Health: Fair, Geotype: Rural Formal, Race: White, Marital Status: Never Married, Gender: Female
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Focusing on the appropriate age specification for the estimation, a hump shaped outline is anticipated for 
derived household net worth over the lifecycle.  The age effect is associated with varying abilities or 
preferences of households over the lifecycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). The expectation is that 
households with younger heads will hold more debts than assets, resulting in either negative or very low 
levels of net worth (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). Figure 6 below shows the calculated turning point of 
the OLS quadratic specification of age utilised in Table Three. It was expected to be at or close to 60 
years of age, retirement age. However, we see that it appears to be closer to 50 years of age, which is ten 
years before females in South Africa are eligible for pension and 15 years before South African males are 
eligible for pension. However, the regression in Table Three indicates that the age and age2 variables are 
rarely significant in either the OLS or quantile regression models. Thus we turn to an age cohort 
specification. 
 
Figure 6: Turning Point of Age 
 
 
An alternative method of accounting for the lifecycle hypothesis in the regression model would be to 
replace the age and age2 covariates with age cohorts. The purpose would be to try and understand the age, 
cohort, and period effects at work within the wealth distribution (Glenn, 2005). Households and 
individuals age in a dynamic society where social and cultural changes impinge on their attitudes and 
behaviour (Glenn, 2005). Differences by age shown in cross sectional data may not necessarily arise as a 
result of age effects; rather the differences might be due to different cohort experiences. Furthermore, 
any estimation of the differences between older and younger households could also be as a result of the 
correlation between wealth and longevity (Glenn, 2005). These complications are as a result of the 
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identification problem present between age, cohort and period effects. It is statistically impossible to 
separate these effects (Glenn, 2005).  We divide the sample population into three equal sized age cohorts, 
namely from 15 to 34, 35 to 48, and 49 to 104. We then utilize OLS regression methods to estimate the 
original estimation model with each age cohort. 
 
Table Four: Regression Model with Age Cohorts 
Dependent Variable: IHS Net Worth 
OLS 
Gender -0.0731 0.0314 -0.0440 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.496) 
Age Cohort 1 (15 to 34) -0.951* - - 
 (0.508)   
Age Cohort 2 (35 to 48) - 0.539 - 
  (0.419)  
Age Cohort 3 (49 to 104) - - 0.159 
   (0.513) 
Education 0.116* 0.0767 0.0998 
 (0.0684) (0.0681) (0.0725) 
African -5.301*** -5.422*** -5.460*** 
 (1.361) (1.360) (1.361) 
Coloured -3.885*** -4.034*** -4.053*** 
 (1.402) (1.400) (1.402) 
Asian -3.237 -3.343 -3.292 
 (2.255) (2.256) (2.259) 
Children -0.295 -0.310 -0.236 
 (0.192) (0.196) (0.193) 
Married 0.724 0.917* 0.951* 
 (0.531) (0.516) (0.521) 
Living with Partner -0.301 -0.405 -0.330 
 (0.735) (0.736) (0.739) 
Widowed 1.233* 1.618*** 1.492** 
 (0.641) (0.618) (0.658) 
Divorced/Separated -0.965 -0.618 -0.654 
 (0.987) (0.968) (0.985) 
Urban Informal 2.893*** 2.933*** 2.873*** 
 (0.950) (0.952) (0.953) 
Tribal Authority Area 4.097*** 4.130*** 4.072*** 
 (0.754) (0.755) (0.756) 
Urban Formal 2.803*** 2.854*** 2.813*** 
 (0.708) (0.709) (0.710) 
Excellent Health 1.049 0.862 0.926 
 (0.672) (0.668) (0.677) 
Very Good Health 0.925 0.825 0.861 
 (0.678) (0.677) (0.681) 
Good Health 0.200 0.102 0.129 
 (0.697) (0.696) (0.698) 
Poor Health 0.212 0.205 0.234 
 (1.056) (1.057) (1.057) 
Constant 7.970*** 7.919*** 7.785*** 
 (1.800) (1.801) (1.865) 
R2 0.060 0.059 0.058 
Observations 1212 1212 1,212 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dummy variable base categories are as follows, Health: Fair, Geotype: Rural Formal, Race: White, Marital Status: 
Never Married, Gender: Female 
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Table Four above details the original estimation across the different age cohorts separately. The results 
are startlingly similar across all three models. In each model the coefficients of African, Coloured, Urban 
Informal, Tribal Authority Area and Urban Formal are significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, Widowed 
is significant in each regression, but at different significance levels; 10 % in the first regression, 1% in the 
second regression and 5% in the last regression. The difference between the regressions lies in the 
variables age cohort, education and married. The first regression model is the only estimation in which an 
age cohort (15 to 34) variable is significant at the 10% level.  
 
It appears that age is an important factor, but only for households with young heads. In the same 
estimation education is also found to be significant at the 10% level. It seems to indicate that education is 
only a prominent factor for households headed by younger individuals and not for older headed 
households. Lastly, the married coefficient only becomes significant in the last two regressions. In the 
second and last regression married is significant at the 10% level. This may be due to the fact that being 
married is only a critical factor for older headed households where assets and liabilities may have to be 
shared.  
 
Looking at the distribution of IHS derived net worth across the specified age cohorts and each Figure 7 
through 9 indicates at least three modes in each age cohort. In each age cohort, derived net worth 
showcases multi-modality, in particular three modes. Thus, a quartic specification of age is more relevant 
for the estimation model. This finding is also reiterated in the work of Murphy & Welch (1990) who 
found that an age quartic specification was a better fit for testing the earnings-age profile within the 
lifecyle hypothesis (Murphy & Welch, 1990). We apply the same logic to net worth in this investigation 
and hypothesis that the signs of the coefficients will be negative for the age variable, positive for age2, 
negative for age3 and lastly positive for age4. 
 
Figure 7: Distributional Plot of IHS Household Net Worth for Age Cohort 15 to 34 
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The age cohort estimations, while generally informative, do not critically explain or separate the age, 
cohort, and period effects within the wealth distribution. Thus, we separate the sample population into 
quantiles, in order to better analyse the distribution at specific points in the sample. The idea is to look at 
the particularly indebted proportion of the population, that is, the 5th quantile, as well as the poor at the 







Initially, the investigation sought to explain the results found in the descriptive analysis. The TAAs hold 
the majority of its assets in real estate, with minor real estate liabilities reported. We attempt to test the 
hypothesis that the wealth accumulation process is detectably dissimilar in TAAs in comparison to the 
other geographic locations. The preliminary regression model was estimated controlling for the 
geographical areas. In all regression results tables, the coefficients are shown to three decimal places, as 
well as the standard error of each coefficient in brackets. The results in Table Five below showed that the 
5th quantile and the 95th quantile did not exhibit any sign similarities and that the TAA binary variable had 
coefficients that were statistically significant at the 1% level in all quantiles tested, except for the 5th and 
95th quantile. Furthermore, the coeffcients on the TAA variable are the largest in every quantile tested. 
For example, in the 10th quantile, a household living in the TAA increases its net worth by 834.3% in 
comparison to a rural formal household, ceteris paribus. This result is astronomical and while not 
necessarily a feasible indication of rural wealth accumulation, does point to the inflated effect 
hypothesized within TAAs. 
 
This does not indicate that the tribal authority area is more important when estimating the wealth 
distribution associated with NIDS Wave 2, or that the behaviour and pattern of wealth accumulation in 
these areas is different from other geographical areas. None of the coefficients of the variables are 
particularly large relative to each other in any quantile. However, when we interpret these coefficients, it 
amounts to a much larger change. For example, in the 10th quantile, a one unit change in the TAA 
variable yields an 83,43% change in IHS net worth, ceteris paribus. 
Table Five: Geotype Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: IHS Net Worth 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
Urban Informal 0.699 3.766 6.216*** 1.176** 0.422 -1.025* 
 (1.019) (3.117) (1.781) (0.462) (0.344) (0.550) 
Tribal 
Authority Area 
2.639 8.343*** 5.607*** 1.283*** 0.715*** -0.634 
 (2.175) (0.694) (1.629) (0.432) (0.265) (0.502) 
Urban Formal -0.321 0.965 5.481*** 2.375*** 1.624*** 1.032** 
 (0.392) (2.029) (1.695) (0.453) (0.267) (0.502) 
Constant -9.070*** -8.343*** -0 7.937*** 10.58*** 13.25*** 
 (0.243) (0.694) (1.622) (0.419) (0.253) (0.498) 
Pseudo R2 0.0147 0.0533 0.0097 0.0141 0.0170 0.0523 
Observations 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;Dummy variable base category is Rural Formal 
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In the final estimation model, the transformed derived net worth variable is regressed on a number of 
explanatory variables as per the estimation equation shown in the methodology section. Table Six showed 
that there were sign similarities in the 5th and 95th quantiles, except for the variables gender, education, 
married, living with partner, divorced and poor health. Thus, there appears to be some evidence of similar 
behaviour patterns in wealth accumulation at the endpoints of the wealth distribution. However, we 
cannot say anything about what this behaviour in fact is, we are simply attempting to identify its 
existence.  
 
The coefficients on the gender, children and health variables are all insignificant in all the quantiles. It is 
quite surprising that children were found to be of no value in the model. Young dependents, in general, 
tend to stifle the ability of a household to accumulate wealth. A better measure of this effect would be to 
ask respondents questions regarding the exact nature, age and employment of all household members. 
The age coefficients are only significant in the 5th and 95th quantile, with sign similarities, all at the 5% 
significance level. For a one-unit change in the 5th quantile age coefficients, the dependent variable 
decreases by 314.53 %. This seems to indicate that the presence of the LCH in the 5th and 95th quantiles, 
implying that LCH effects are prevalent in the rich and indebted proportions of the sample. These would 
tend to be the high-income households with younger household heads. Lastly, the age coefficients all 
conform to the initial sign hypothesis. The health coefficients have much the same results as in Table 
Three; the only significant coefficient is on Poor Health in the 95th quantile at the 10% significance level. 
It does not appear that the health variable utilised from the survey has had much effect in helping to 
explain wealth accumulation in the sample. This may be due to the fact that the variable is the 
respondent’s perceived health status, rather than a variable based on medical records. 
 
The coefficients on African and Coloured are significant in every quantile at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. However, the Asian coefficients are only significant at the 10% significance level in the 
5th and 10th quantiles. The negative coefficients on the race variables indicate that the marginalization 
created during apartheid is still very present. The overall picture that emerges from the analysis is that the 
effects of Apartheid are ever present in the economy, as evidenced by the negative and significant 
coefficients on the race variables. The education coefficients are significant only in the 25th quantile at the 
10% significance level and in the 50th, 75th and 95th quantile at the 1% significance level. Thus it appears 
that education is important for the relatively poor and relatively rich, but has little significance for those 
with negative net worth. The education variable has a negative, although insignificant coefficient in the 5th 
quantile. This is an intriguing result, as it appears to signify that when households are indebted, their 
education level has no effect on their ability to accumulate wealth. Furthermore, the education 
coefficients, while mostly significant, do not have particularly large coefficients. It seems that education, 
while important, is not quintessential for the household’s prosperity. This is a somewhat shocking finding 
and might be as a result of hidden effects present owing to the differing education systems received by 
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different races during apartheid.  
 
The TAA variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in the 10th, 25th and 50th quantiles at the 1% 
significance level and at the 75th and 95th quantiles at the 10% significance level. The Urban Formal 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level in the 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles and the Urban Informal 
coefficient is only significant at the 1% level in the 25th and 50th quantile. The location of the household 
appears to be vital to modeling the wealth distribution, as it defines the type of capital accumulation 
occurring in the region. This outcome is especially convincing when we recollect that those households 
living in rural areas tend to be those who bore the brunt of discrimination. The positive coefficients on 
every geotype variable in every quantile indicate that all geotypes are wealthier than rural formal areas. 
This is not an expected result, although rural areas do tend to house the poorest of the poor. This effect 
could be due to the incorrect reporting of assets and liabilities, particularly in TAAs.  
 
The married coefficient is significant at the 1% level in the 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles. Similarly to the 
results in Table Three, it appears that being married is only meaningful for the richer proportion of the 
sample. Divorced and Living with Partner coefficients do not show any significance across the quantiles 
in comparison to households with heads whom have never been married. Whereas, results indicated that 
households with a widowed head has a positive effect on said household’s wealth accumulation. 
Furthermore, the significance on the coefficients indicates that being widowed matters particularly for the 
poorest, average and wealthiest households. The main conclusions from the model are that being a white, 
educated, healthy household in any geographic location other than rural formal, is the optimal model for 
wealth accumulation across all quantiles in our sample. The marital status of a household is also 
particularly important, however, the effects vary across the quantiles.  
 
The model is limited severely by the lack of available wealth data from the survey and from expanded 
questionnaires to further probe the anomalies of South African wealth accumulation. Most notably, 
another time period of data would also allow broader scope for the research and more meaningful 
conclusions. Questions on risk preferences, saving behavior and attitudes tend to be erroneously reported 
for various reasons, depending on the circumstances and characteristics of a household. Furthermore, 
household composition data could be illuminating particularly with respect to both inter- and intra- 
generational effects. The findings of this estimation point us in the direction of further research, rather 








Table Six: Final Regression Model 
 Dependent Variable: IHS Net Worth  
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
       
Gender -1.315 -2.031 -0.100 0.0233 0.231 0.0985 
 (0.868) (1.467) (0.902) (0.285) (0.200) (0.201) 
Age -3.246** -0.675 -0.940 -0.449 -0.206 -1.373** 
 (1.524) (1.816) (1.212) (0.645) (0.325) (0.602) 
Age2 0.102** 0.0284 0.0367 0.0192 0.00951 0.0441** 
 (0.0455) (0.0523) (0.0353) (0.0177) (0.00945) (0.0188) 
Age3 -0.00135** -0.000456 -0.000527 -0.000288 -0.000143 -0.000579** 
 (0.000581) (0.000637) (0.000431) (0.000206) (0.000117) (0.000252) 
Age4 6.32e-06** 2.46e-06 2.53e-06 1.41e-06 6.94e-07 2.69e-06** 
 (2.69e-06) (2.81e-06) (1.88e-06) (8.66e-07) (5.16e-07) (1.22e-06) 
Education -0.139 0.00107 0.177* 0.204*** 0.134*** 0.108*** 
 (0.119) (0.157) (0.0942) (0.0370) (0.0244) (0.0255) 
African -20.24* -19.50*** -5.910*** -2.967*** -1.621*** -1.811*** 
 (11.32) (6.931) (1.460) (0.534) (0.358) (0.519) 
Coloured -20.36* -17.75** -3.542*** -1.935*** -1.204*** -1.386** 
 (11.49) (7.152) (1.311) (0.475) (0.398) (0.558) 
Asian -24.17* -24.17* 1.111 0.0683 -0.470 -0.324 
 (12.90) (13.37) (11.72) (2.977) (0.652) (0.789) 
Children -0.183 -0.447 -0.213 -0.156 -0.115 -0.0171 
 (0.412) (0.713) (0.291) (0.111) (0.0729) (0.0837) 
Married -1.135 -0.638 1.250 1.210*** 0.880*** 0.740*** 
 (0.970) (1.544) (1.045) (0.395) (0.192) (0.219) 
Living with Partner -0.0654 1.311 -0.202 -0.214 -0.122 -0.0157 
 (1.121) (2.067) (1.814) (0.568) (0.269) (0.356) 
Widowed 0.516 0.998 1.059 1.157*** 0.724*** 0.267 
 (1.732) (1.679) (1.123) (0.438) (0.228) (0.302) 
Divorced/Separated -1.437 -1.297 -4.254* -0.788 0.497 0.284 
 (1.846) (2.344) (2.196) (1.442) (0.594) (0.379) 
Urban Informal 0.463 1.903 7.069*** 3.002*** 0.439 0.330 
 (1.376) (2.538) (2.521) (1.069) (0.462) (0.389) 
Tribal Authority Area 1.809 7.929*** 6.802*** 3.140*** 0.724* 0.543* 
 (1.703) (1.868) (1.837) (1.014) (0.407) (0.303) 
Urban Formal 0.272 1.394 5.804*** 2.805*** 0.987*** 1.138*** 
 (1.067) (1.731) (1.580) (1.055) (0.378) (0.337) 
Excellent Health 0.0403 1.745 1.211 0.583 0.363 0.0441 
 (1.253) (1.844) (1.555) (0.419) (0.266) (0.238) 
Very Good Health -0.484 1.342 1.279 0.584 0.119 -0.417 
 (1.086) (1.805) (1.450) (0.409) (0.268) (0.255) 
Good Health -0.433 0.349 0.460 0.0984 -0.242 -0.434 
 (1.069) (1.571) (1.411) (0.388) (0.280) (0.306) 
Poor Health 0.787 3.505 0.689 -0.728 -0.165 -0.613* 
 (3.491) (2.639) (1.642) (0.736) (0.445) (0.351) 
Constant 50.04** 16.09 8.881 9.495 11.35*** 27.27*** 
 (22.50) (22.76) (14.50) (8.348) (4.056) (6.912) 
Pseudo R2 0.0445 0.0907 0.0519 0.0573 0.0601 0.1062 
Observations 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dummy variable base categories are as follows, Health: Fair, 
Geotype: Rural Formal, Race: White, Marital Status: Never Married, Gender: Female
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Following from the legacy of economic marginalisation mentioned in the Background section, we 
explicitly tested the hypothesis that there is a discernible difference in the wealth accumulation of those 
that reside in the tribal authority areas and those that reside in the other geotype categories. In each 
quantile, we tested the null hypothesis that the three coefficients of the geotype variable were equal. The 
two possible null hypotheses being tested are as follows: 
 
( 1)  - geotype4 + geotype2 = 0 
( 2)  geotype2 - geotype3 = 0 
 
The Wald test indicates that the coefficients of the geographical variables are statistically different from 
each other, except in the 25th quantile of the Geotype regression and the 5th, 25th and 50th quantile of the 
final estimation. This echoes previous findings in all the regression models estimated and the hypotheses 
stated in the background literature. The Wald test for 25th quantile in both models yields a failure to reject 
the null hypothesis, possibly indicating some of the overlap found in the pairwise correlation of Tribal 
Authority Area and Urban Formal (Shown in Appendix Two). The geotype variables are particularly 
significant for the estimation of the wealth distribution in NIDS Wave 2. Specifically, the Tribal Authority 




Table Seven: Geotype Regression Post-estimation Test 
Wald test of Linear Hypothesis for the Geotype Regression 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
F(2, 2841) 22.95 2183.40 0.98 54.49 44.87 92.97 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.000 0.3752 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Table Eight: Final Regression Model Post-estimation Test  
Wald test of Linear Hypothesis for the Final Estimation 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
F(2,1466) 0.52 19.96 0.90 0.67 4.04 5.71 








This investigation sought to explore the determinants of wealth in South Africa, utilising Wave 2 of 
NIDS. In particular, we evaluated the significance of the lifecycle hypothesis in the distribution and 
attempted to identify the existence of different wealth accumulation behaviour in tribal authority areas. 
The focus on tribal authority areas was as a result of the extensive racially based marginalisation of 
households in that geographic location. Quantile regression methods were utilised in order to account for 
different wealth accumulation behavior apparent at different points in the household wealth distribution, 
 
The portfolio (assets and liabilities) composition across the age distribution appeared to indicate some 
evidence that the lifecycle hypothesis is not present in the data. Furthermore the distribution of assets and 
liabilities across the 4 geotypes specified indicated the presence of a hidden effect within Tribal Authority 
Areas. While real estate assets largely dominated most of the geographic locations, TAAs did not exhibit 
the corresponding real estate debt required to finance such asset accumulation. 
 
It appears that wealth accumulation in South Africa cannot be explained utilizing only the life cycle 
hypothesis. This is evidenced by the insignificance of the age variables in both the quadratic and quartic 
specification, except possibly for those households with very high levels of net worth. This is particularly 
true in rural households where the household structure does not require young and middle age adults to 
save for retirement. Rather, these adults may depend on the older household head. Furthermore, income 
and asset accumulation may be uncertain in poor households and as such these households may only save 
when they have surplus income. The presence of non-linearity in the wealth distribution is not easily 
explained by the estimation and more in-depth investigation is required. Perhaps the inclusion of time 
preferences, risk and savings attitudes in future waves of NIDS would allow for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the effects at work., but for NIDS Wave 2, this can only be conjectured and represents 
an important form of omitted variable bias in the models estimated in this paper. 
 
It must be noted that these results do not indicate that the LCH predictions are violated in the South 
African wealth distribution. The LCH model appears to apply to particular quantiles of the population, 
that is, the wealthier households and the particularly indebted households. In particular, the results found 
these to be households with younger heads, which align with LCH predictions. Poorer households, or 
those whose assets and liabilities are approximately equal do not appear to accumulate wealth in the same 
manner as their upper and lower quantile counterparts. However, we cannot formally identify the LCH 
econometrically at a particular quantile. Rather, the LCH must be present in the overall distribution of 
wealth. The multi-modality of the household wealth distribution, the failure of the predicted age effects 
and the failing of the OLS estimation method suggest that the South African wealth distribution does not 
conform to the LCH at this point in time.  
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Tribal Authority Areas coefficients were statistically significant in almost every quantile and estimation in 
which it appears. Furthermore, both the descriptive and analytical results indicated an anomaly in the 
distribution of wealth over the geographical areas. The effect cannot be identified within this 
investigation. However, the evidence for this hidden effect is present throughout the findings. These 
outcomes are only the stepping-stones to identifying the effect of communal land ownership, the legacy 
of discriminatory apartheid laws and chieftain rule.  
 
No major conclusions can be made from the investigation into these effects beyond the implication of a 
different coefficient in tribal authority areas due to the fact that data are observational only, rather than 
set up specifically to identify different wealth behavior resulting from different land tenure arrangements 
in TAAs. In order to conclude any strong effects, the wealth questions must continue to be asked in the 
NIDS household surveys, so that we may have panel data with which to compare households over time 
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Appendix 1: Outlier Detection Methods - Bacon vsHadimvo 
 
Hadimvo is an outlier identification algorithm in STATA, which identifies multiple outliers in multivariate 
data using the method of Hadi (1992, 1994), creating a new variable equal to 1 if an observation is an 
"outlier" and 0 otherwise. The process for detecting the outliers is outlined in Hadi (1992) (Hadi, 1992). 
For an nxp data matrix, the n observations are ordered using a robust measure of outlyingness. The data 
set is then divided into two subsets; one being the p+1 ‘good’ observations and the other being the n-p-1 
‘bad’ observations (Hadi, 1992). Then the relative distance from each point in the data set to the centre of 
the former data set is computed, relative to the covariance matrix of that subset (Hadi, 1992). Next, the n 
observations are rearranged in ascending order and the dataset is once again divided into two subsets; one 
with p+2 ‘good’ observations and the other with n-p-2 ‘bad’ observations (Hadi, 1992). This process is 
repeated until the stopping criterion is met and the final subset of ‘bad’ observations is declared as 
outliers (Hadi, 1992). 
 
The bacon outlier detection method identifies multiple outliers in multivariate data using the blocked 
adaptive computationally efficient outlier nominators (BACON) algorithm proposed by Billor, Hadi, and 
Velleman (2000) (Billor et al, 2000). It creates a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if an observation is 
an outlier and equal to 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a second variable can be created which contains the 
distances from the basic subset. Bacon establishes an improvement of hadimvo, which also is used to 
identify multivariate outliers, but is much less computationally intensive and provides similar results. 
Hadimvo tends to take hours or sometimes days to indicate outliers, particularly in large datasets. 
 
The idea behind bacon is that m outlier-free observations must be identified in the dataset of n 
observations and over p variables. The Mahalanobis distance is used as the criterion, since it is scale-
invariant, especially when dealing with variables of different magnitudes and units (Billor et al, 2000). The 
tables below indicate the results of using hadimvo and bacon respectively. It appears that bacon is stricter in 
its identification of outliers than hadimvo, although hadimvo does not allow for outlier detection of the 
one shot net worth variable, as a singular matrix is created. Although bacon and hadimvo are meant to be 
perfect substitutes, the differences in the variables are quite significant. For example, financial assets have 
550 outliers when utilizing, but only 99 outliers when Bacon is employed. Conversely, for retirement 













Table Nine: Outlier Results 
 Hadimvo Bacon 
Variable Before After Outliers After Outliers 
Income 3516 3349 167 3482 34 






 1730 135 
Total Assets 2571 2220 351 2519 52 
Total Debts 812 679 133 765 47 
Real Estate Debt 125 125 0 125 0 
Business Debt 13 11 2 12 1 
Vehicle Debt 61 56 5 61 0 
Financial Debt 735 690 45 725 10 
Real Estate 
Assets 
1740 1444 296 1703 37 
Business Assets 59 30 29 6 53 
Vehicle Assets 373 352 21 368 5 
Financial Assets 1604 1341 263 1552 52 
Retirement 
Annuity Assets 
73 36 37 72 1 


















Appendix 2: OLS Regression Diagnostics 
 
The 6 OLS Assumptions are presented below in order to validate the use of the OLS estimation model. 
Regression diagnostic tests were performed to test each assumption of each model. Each test is detailed 
under the assumptions below. The regression models being tested are the OLS regression with the age 
quadratic specification and the three OLS regressions with Age Cohort Specifications. The Four OLS 
models estimated were found to be misspecified as the assumptions are not all met. In particular, the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity, normality of the residuals, linearity in parameters and the zero 
conditional mean were violated. 
 
Assumption 1: No Perfect Collinearity 
In the sample, none of the independent variables are constant and exhibit no exact linear 
relationships. 
 
The assumption was tested, by creating a pairwise correlation table of all the explanatory variables in each 
model. For the assumption to hold, the independent variables must not be closely correlated in a negative 
or positive manner. The only values of concern are the relationships between African and Coloured, Age 
and Age2, and Urban Formal and Tribal Authority Area. African and Coloured are highly negatively 
correlated at -0.809, however, this correlation is to be expected between the two races. Similarly for Age 
and Age2, a high correlation value is expected (0.983) as they are perfectly non-linearly related. Urban 
Formal and Tribal Authority Area are negatively correlated at -0.682, which is not an unexpected result, as 
geographical locations have areas of overlap. The results in Tables Ten through Thirteen below showed 
that there are no exact or close to exact linear relationships between the explanatory variables and thus 



















Table Ten: Pairwise Correlation of Covariates for Age Quadratic Specification 
 























































-0.067 -0.809 1 
             
Asian 0.043 0.012 0.006 0.059 -0.196 -0.034 1 






-0.122 0.023 0.001 0.005 1 
           
Married 0.196 0.119 0.080 0.005 -0.126 0.042 0.076 0.150 1 








-0.034 -0.015 0.052 -0.012 0.016 -0.178 1 




0.480 0.491 -0.226 0.027 -0.020 0.003 -0.094 -0.300 -0.137 1 




0.085 0.066 0.029 -0.114 0.081 -0.020 
-
0.0257 
-0.147 -0.067 -0.113 1 
       





-0.016 0.096 -0.066 -0.025 0.014 -0.068 0.0523 -0.048 0.034 1 





0.193 0.196 -0.185 0.352 -0.283 -0.069 0.120 0.015 -0.079 0.178 -0.067 -0.211 1 
     





0.228 -0.322 0.244 0.049 -0.113 0.029 -0.029 -0.089 0.066 -0.247 -0.682 1 








0.205 -0.021 0.008 0.011 0.052 0.025 0.037 -0.171 -0.003 -0.010 -0.091 0.085 1 






























































                
Education 0.1046 0.0632 1 
               
African -0.0478 -0.0311 -0.0987 1 
              
Coloured -0.0179 0.0496 -0.0670 -0.8089 1 
             
Asian 0.0428 0.0221 0.0590 -0.1963 -0.0343 1 
            
Children 0.0462 0.2748 -0.1222 0.0229 0.0005 0.0053 1 
           
Married 0.1956 0.1169 0.0049 -0.1262 0.0420 0.0764 
 
1 
          
Living with 
Partner 
0.0845 0.0761 -0.0338 -0.0146 0.0519 -0.0115 0.0163 -0.1783 1 
         
Widowed -0.2726 -0.1958 -0.2259 0.0271 -0.0196 0.0028 -0.0935 -0.2997 -0.1370 1 
        
Divorced -0.0600 0.0037 0.0285 -0.1139 0.0805 -0.0202 -0.0257 -0.1466 -0.0670 -0.1126 1 
       
Urban 
Informal 
0.0263 -0.0189 -0.0175 0.0962 -0.0663 -0.0250 0.0142 -0.0678 0.0527 -0.0482 0.0337 1 




-0.1656 -0.0744 -0.1850 0.3519 -0.2834 -0.0691 0.1195 0.0154 -0.0791 0.1780 -0.0672 -0.2111 1 
     
Urban 
Formal 
0.0758 0.0467 0.2281 -0.3224 0.2439 0.0493 -0.1133 0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0893 0.0657 -0.2470 -0.6815 1 
    
Excellent 
Health 
0.1014 0.0806 0.2052 -0.0210 0.0082 0.0113 0.0521 0.0249 0.0371 -0.1705 -0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0909 0.0845 1 
   
Very Good 
Health 
























































                 
Age 
Cohort 
(35 to 48) 
0.0839 1 
                
Educatio
n 
0.1046 0.3077 1 
               
African -0.0478 0.0998 -0.0987 1 
              
Coloured -0.0179 -0.0493 -0.0670 -0.8089 1 
             
Asian 0.0428 -0.0321 0.0590 -0.1963 -0.0343 1 
            
Children 0.0462 -0.1289 -0.1222 0.0229 0.0005 0.0053 1 
           
Married 0.1956 -0.2180 0.0049 -0.1262 0.0420 0.0764 0.1499 1 




0.0845 0.0672 -0.0338 -0.0146 0.0519 -0.0115 0.0163 -0.1783 1 
         
Widowed -0.2726 -0.2706 -0.2259 0.0271 -0.0196 0.0028 -0.0935 -0.2997 -0.1370 1 




-0.0600 -0.1129 0.0285 -0.1139 0.0805 -0.0202 -0.0257 -0.1466 -0.0670 -0.1126 1 
       
Urban 
Informal 
0.0263 0.0627 -0.0175 0.0962 -0.0663 -0.0250 0.0142 -0.0678 0.0527 -0.0482 0.0337 1 




-0.1656 -0.1055 -0.1850 0.3519 -0.2834 -0.0691 0.1195 0.0154 -0.0791 0.1780 -0.0672 -0.2111 1 
     
Urban 
Formal 
0.0758 0.0411 0.2281 -0.3224 0.2439 0.0493 -0.1133 0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0893 0.0657 -0.2470 -0.6815 1 
    
Excellent 
Health 
0.1014 0.2137 0.2052 -0.0210 0.0082 0.0113 0.0521 0.0249 0.0371 -0.1705 -0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0909 0.0845 1 

























(35 to 48) 



























                
Education 0.1046 -0.3565 1 
               
African -0.0478 -0.0592 -0.0987 1 
              
Coloured -0.0179 -0.0024 -0.0670 -0.8089 1 
             
Asian 0.0428 0.0079 0.0590 -0.1963 -0.0343 1 
            
Children 0.0462 -0.1584 -0.1222 0.0229 0.0005 0.0053 1 
           
Married 0.1956 0.0851 0.0049 -0.1262 0.0420 0.0764 0.1499 1 
          
Living with 
Partner 
0.0845 -0.1301 -0.0338 -0.0146 0.0519 -0.0115 0.0163 -0.1783 1 
         
Widowed -0.2726 0.4212 -0.2259 0.0271 -0.0196 0.0028 -0.0935 -0.2997 -0.1370 1 
        
Divorced -0.0600 0.0967 0.0285 -0.1139 0.0805 -0.0202 -0.0257 -0.1466 -0.0670 -0.1126 1 
       
Urban 
Informal 
0.0263 -0.0371 -0.0175 0.0962 -0.0663 -0.0250 0.0142 -0.0678 0.0527 -0.0482 0.0337 1 




-0.1656 0.1607 -0.1850 0.3519 -0.2834 -0.0691 0.1195 0.0154 -0.0791 0.1780 -0.0672 -0.2111 1 
     
Urban 
Formal 
0.0758 -0.0790 0.2281 -0.3224 0.2439 0.0493 -0.1133 0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0893 0.0657 -0.2470 -0.6815 1 
    
Excellent 
Health 
0.1014 -0.2643 0.2052 -0.0210 0.0082 0.0113 0.0521 0.0249 0.0371 -0.1705 -0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0909 0.0845 1 
   
Very Good 
Health 








-0.0637 0.1549 -0.1719 0.0256 -0.0171 0.0079 -0.0252 -0.0220 -0.0141 0.1247 0.0037 0.0287 0.0347 -0.0196 -0.1627 -0.1561 -0.1401 1 
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Assumption 2: Homoskedasticity of the Residuals 
The variance of the residuals is constant. 
Employing the Breusch-Pagan test for homoskedasticty in residuals tested the assumption of constant 
variance. In order for the variance of the residuals to be determined as constant, the test must fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of constant variance. The p-values of each test are quite small and close to zero 
in Table Fourteen below indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected and the assumption is violated. The 
residuals appear to be heteroskedastic in nature, indicating that they exhibit non-constant variance in all 
the OLS regression models estimated. 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of IHS net worth 
 
Table Fourteen: Breusch-Pagan test for Homoskedasticty of Residuals  
 Age Quadratic Age Cohort 15 to 34 Age Cohort 35 to 48 Age Cohort 49 to 104 
chi(1) 9.38 9.22 10.45 9.73 
Prob>F 0.0022 0.0024 0.0012 0.0018 
 
Assumption 3: Normality of Residuals 
The residuals are normally distributed. 
The normality of the residuals is tested by looking at a kernel density plot of the residuals in relation to 
the normal distribution. Furthermore, qnorm and pnorm plots were created to further emphasise the 
results of the kernel density plot. These graphs showcase the quantiles of the residual against quantiles of 
normal distribution and the standard normal probability plot of the residuals respectively. All of the plots 
for each OLS regression model estimated indicate a significant deviation from normality. Thus the 
assumption is violated for all four OLS models. 
 
Figure 10: Kernel Density Plot of Residuals (Age Quadratic) 
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Figure 11: Kernel Density Plot of Residuals (Age Cohort 15 to 34) 
 
 
Figure 12: Kernel Density Plot of Residuals (Age Cohort 35 to 48) 
 
 




Figure 14: Qnorm Plot of Residuals (Age Quadratic) 
 
 
Figure 15: Qnorm Plot of Residuals (Age Cohort 15 to 34) 
 
 




Figure 17: Qnorm Plot of Residuals (Age Cohort 49 to 104) 
 
 
Figure 18: Pnorm Plot of Residuals (Age Quadratic) 
 
 





















Assumption 4: Linear in Parameters 
The coefficients (parameters) of the model are all linear. 
Creating scatter plots of the relationship between the residuals and each non-categorical variable tested 
the assumption of linearity in the parameters. As shown in Figures 10 through 13, it is evident that none 
of these plots reveal a linear relationship between the residuals and the independent variables. Thus the 




Figure 22: Residuals and Age (Age Quadratic) 
 
 








Figure 24: Residuals and Children (Age Quadratic) 
 
 
Figure 25: Residuals and Education (Age Quadratic) 
 
 




Figure 27: Residuals and Children (Age Cohort 15 to 34) 
 
 
Figure 28: Residuals and Education (Age Cohort 35 to 48) 
 
 























Assumption 5: Random Sampling 
The data is a random sample of the population. 
This assumption does not require explicit testing. Although there is attrition present in NIDS, as a result 
of household nonresponse between waves, the correct weights were applied to correct for this matter. 
Thus the assumption is not violated. 
 
Assumption 6: Zero Conditional Mean 
The error has an expected value of zero, given any value of the explanatory variables. 
The testing of this assumption is contentious, as there is no way to truly test the expected value of the 
error in the sample. We plot the predicted values against the fitted values and in order for the assumption 
to be met; the values should cluster around zero. Figure 32 through 35 below showed that the values do 
not cluster around zero, in fact they are closer to ten, as such the assumption is not met. 
 
Figure 32: Testing Zero Conditional Mean Assumption (Age Quadratic) 
 
 








Figure 35: Testing Zero Conditional Mean Assumption (Age Quadratic) 
 
 
These preceding tests of the OLS assumptions found that not all assumptions were met. In particular, the 
residuals were found to be heteroskedastic, non-normally distributed, and evidence of non-linearity in the 
parameters was found. Finally, the zero conditional mean assumption was violated. As such the OLS 
estimation models are misspecified and inadequate for the estimation of determinants of wealth in South 
Africa 
